Vojko Strahovnik – MORAL JUDGEMENTS, INTUITION AND MORAL PRINCIPLES

The author gives his systematic, critical and all- comprehensive consideration of moral intuitionism and outlines his advocacy. Two core aspects of intuitionism are depicted here. The first one is a cognitive aspect of moral intuition as the source of moral justification. The second aspect is moral pluralism as a normative structure of moral theory. His advocacy is based on newer discourses and view-points in contemporary moral theory and metaethics. The author introduces and discloses the concept of moral intuition, i.e. moral insight. The chapters that follow process and analyse historical variants of moral intuitionism, especially by authors such as  Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore, H.A. Prichard, W.D. Ross and C.D. Broad. The second part of the book outlines particularistic challenge to the moral theory that questions the role of moral principles and rules in moral thought and practice. The author advocates for a new and interesting thesis that moral particularism is above the thesis on moral generalities, not the nature of reasoning. Answers are given to two central challenges opposing the moral intuitionism as moral pluralism. Firstly, the concession is given that the existence of moral conflict and moral dilemmas has no fatal consequences for the moral theory. Quite to the contrary – if we turn around the perspective and put the phenomenology accompanying the moral conflict as the starting point, then the moral theory allowing for the conflict, or rather being able to adapt, seems to have the advantage. The author favours the attitude that the moral conflict and dilemmas are properly adaptable within the intuitionistic model prima facie duty. Secondly, the original image of moral reasons, moral principle and moral judgements is given. The image was built on the concept of prima facie duty as one of the central terms of ethics. The characteristics of actions such as honesty, veracity, righteousness, devotion, graciousness, harmlessness, etc, are fundamental and morally pertinent characteristics, and – as prima facie duty – fundamental moral reasons.