The study tries to situate sources of the inferential preference of the writing in respect to the spoken word, as it got established in philosophy. Following rationalist tradition, Gottlob Frege proposed a conceptual writing project (Begriffsschrift), inspired by arithmetical calculus. As soon as this was done, it was shown that a desired architecture cannot hold without that some inconsistent kind of support is introduced. In order to avoid this conundrum, Russell with his theory of types proposed a stratified approach to language, involving object language and several metalanguages. Another angle was a search for meaning and accounting for epistemic power of language, which Frege proposed by his distinction between sense and reference. Meaning tried to be strictly scientifically supported, and yet it repeatedly encountered the speech as its limit. Finally, the road towards the definite description controversy between Russell and P.F. Strawson is hinted at: whereas the first one established the basis for philosophical analysis through the assumption that language primarily describes the world, the second one pointed out language’s communicative and implications conveying rich power. This goes contrary to reducing the direct approach of language to the world through Russellian proper name, where the preferred logico-linguisitc kernel ends up as language and sense avoiding demonstrative.